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The Federal Anti-Bias Effort
Jonathan S. Leonard 
University of California
Affirmative action under the federal contract compliance program (Ex 
ecutive Order 11246 as amended) is a policy that, at times, has promoted 
modest employment advances for minorities, but always at the cost of 
great social discord. To its proponents, affirmative action is both equitable 
and efficient. To its critics, it is neither.
Federal affirmative action may be modeled as a tax on white male 
employment in contractor firms, and so can be analyzed in the standard 
two-sector models applied to unionization or taxation (Leonard 1984a). 
A controversial question is whether this tax improves or reduces effi 
ciency. Some proponents of affirmative action advocate it for equity 
reasons, arguing for retribution for past wrongs such as slavery, or for 
an investment in future social peace and cohesion. Increased equity may 
also improve efficiency by counterbalancing discrimination. In Decker's 
model of discrimination, for example, an affirmative action tax forces 
employers towards the efficient use of labor (Leonard 1984c). The two 
questions to be asked of affirmative action are first, whether it has in 
creased minority and female employment, and second (and more dif 
ficult), whether this has induced or reduced discrimination.
The purpose and development of affirmative action cannot be fully 
understood outside of history, a history that includes most saliently the 
institution of slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 
civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century. The genesis in discord 
and crisis of the first Executive Order by President Roosevelt is most 
instructive. To protest employment discrimination at the beginning of 
World War II, A. Philip Randolph, president of the Sleeping Car Porters 
Union, threatened to disrupt the defense effort by a mass demonstration 
of blacks in Washington, D.C. on July 1, 1941. Less than one week before
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the planned rally, Executive Order 8802 was issued and the demonstra 
tion called off (Goldstein 1981, p. 10). In the words of the U.S. Com 
mission on Civil Rights, "the Executive Order was prompted by the threat 
of a Negro March on Washington, which would have revealed to the 
world a divided country at a time when national unity was essential" 
(USCCR 1961, p. 10). Accommodation was only reached under dire 
threat, and even then was of a limited nature.
The distance this country has come in terms of the growing import 
of affirmative action, expanding intervention by the federal government, 
and changing attitudes towards discrimination since 1941 can best be 
judged by considering the words of Mark Ethridge, first chairman of 
the Fair Employment Practice Committee, established to supervise com 
pliance with the executive order. In the following quote, Ethridge sharply 
limits the scope of antidiscrimination policy in a manner startling to 
modern eyes.
Although he defended the granting of civil rights and equal oppor 
tunity to Negroes, he also affirmed his personal support of segrega 
tion in the South. Stressing that 'the committee has taken no posi 
tion on the question of segregation of industrial workers,' he em 
phasized that 'Executive Order 8802 is a war order, and not a social 
document,' that it did not require the elimination of segregation, 
and that had it done so, he would have considered it 'against the 
general peace and welfare ... in the Nazi dictatorial pattern rather 
than in the slower, more painful but sounder pattern of the 
democratic process.' (Ruchames 1953, p. 28)
Of course, the delicate question of how to swiftly remedy the harm 
done by discrimination without distorting the democratic process is still 
with us, as is the question of whether the democratic process can func 
tion well outside an integrated society. Democratic society requires a 
consensus for change, but it depends upon the full participation of its 
members. The last 40 years have witnessed a slow and at times painful 
process of confrontation and accommodation, developing a consensus 
that provides the foundation for a lasting change in attitudes towards 
discrimination.
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Prior to Executive Order 10925, issued March 6, 1961 by President 
Kennedy, the antidiscrimination program for federal contractors lacked 
any real teeth. In a detailed study of the presidential Fair Employment 
Practice Committees, Norgren and Hill (1964, p. 169, p. 171) state: "One 
can only conclude that the twenty years of intermittent activity by 
presidential committees has had little effect on traditional patterns of 
Negro employment," and that "it is evident that the non-discrimination 
clause in government contracts was virtually unenforced by the contracting 
agencies during the years preceding 1961." Compliance programs, such 
as Plans for Progress and its predecessors, were voluntary. Their history 
strikes at least a cautionary note about the effectiveness of programs 
that have no legal sanctions behind them. The 1961 Executive Order 
was the first to go beyond antidiscrimination and to require contractors 
to take affirmative action, and the first to establish specific sanctions 
including termination of contract and debarment. Coming on the heels 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11246, which 
made the Secretary of Labor rather than a presidential committee respon 
sible for administering enforcement, was the first to be enforced stringent 
ly enough to provoke serious conflict and debate. On October 13, 1967, 
Executive Order 11375 amended 11246 to expand its coverage to women, 
although effective regulation against sex discrimination did not reach 
full stride until after the Equal Employment Act of 1972 was enacted.
The details of the affirmative action obligation began to be elaborated 
in a twisting history. Detailed regulations, including numerical goals, 
were introduced in 1969, after the Comptroller General ruled that the 
affirmative action obligation was too vague to fulfill the requirement 
that minimum contract standards be made clear to prospective bidders 
[48 Comp. Gen. 326 (1968)]. Numerical goals were first introduced in 
the manning tables embodied in the Cleveland and Philadelphia plans 
for construction contractors (see Jones 1982), and later won the tacit 
approval of Congress and the courts.
Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors agree "not to 
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because 
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and to take affirmative 
action to ensure that applicants are employed and employees are treated
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during employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin" [3 C.F.R 169 202(1) (1974)]. This language imposes two 
obligations: first, not to discriminate; and second, whether or not there 
is any evidence of discrimination, to take affirmative action not to discrim 
inate. It is a measure of this nation's progress that the first obligation 
is now largely beyond debate. The redundant sounding second obliga 
tion, however, is anything but. It has provoked continual controversy, 
and its meaning and effect are not well understood. In the heated political 
arguments over whether and what affirmative action should be, mythic 
visions have come to overwhelm any clear conception of what affirmative 
action actually is. To say that this second obligation, as it has been 
developed in the regulations, has provoked a good deal of debate would 
be a considerable understatement (see also Fiss 1971 and Glazer 1975). 
Reviewing the development of affirmative action into "quotas," 
Lawrence Silberman, former Undersecretary of Labor from 1970 to 1973, 
wrote:
In practice, employers anxious to avoid inquiry from government 
officials concerned only with results (rather than merely with ef 
forts) often earmarked jobs for minorities without regard to 
qualifications. . . . We wished to create a generalized, firm, but 
gentle pressure to balance the residue of discrimination. Unfor 
tunately, the pressure numerical standards generate cannot be 
generalized or gentle; it inevitably causes injustice. . . . Our use 
of numerical standards in pursuit of equal opportunity has led in- 
eluctably to the very quotas, guaranteeing equal results, that we 
initially wished to avoid. . . . Federal courts already had begun 
to fashion orders in employment discrimination cases which went 
beyond relief for those specifically discriminated against. The orders 
required employers found guilty of discrimination to hire in accor 
dance with a set ratio of whites to blacks, whether or not new black 
applicants had suffered discrimination. Thus was introduced a group 
rights concept antithetical to traditional American notions of in 
dividual merit and responsibility.
This raises at least two issues. The first is that an affirmative action 
program without measurable results invites sham efforts and may also 
fail to meet the requirement of federal procurement law that prospective
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bidders be informed of the minimum standards for a contract. On the 
other hand,numerical standards in the quest for equal opportunity open 
the door to an emphasis on equal results. The second issue raised is 
whether discrimination and its remedy should be addressed in terms of 
groups or individuals.
In the past, the affirmative action obligation has been criticized as 
being vague and open-ended. In 1967, the director of the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance (OFCC), Edward Sylvester, stated: "There is no 
fixed and firm definition of affirmative action. I would say that in a 
general way, affirmative action is anything you have to do to get 
results. . . . Affirmative action is really designed to get employers to 
apply the same kind of imagination and ingenuity that they apply to other 
phases of their operation" (Report 1967, pp. 73-74).
To be vague concerning methods is the ideal decentralized approach, 
but this is also vague about the critical issue of ends. What is the goal 
against which results are judged: nondiscrimination or increased minority 
and female employment? The distinct, practical question of whether the 
two can be distinguished in an operational sense is, of course, one of 
the important questions that will concern us here.
Past Studies
The literature on affirmative action can be divided into studies of the 
regulatory process that finds it mortally flawed and studies of impact 
that find it successful. The process studies by the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights (USCCR), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the 
House and Senate Committees on Labor and Public Welfare all conclude 
that affirmative action has been ineffective and blame weak enforce 
ment and a reluctance to apply sanctions. For example, in its 1975 ap 
praisal of the contract compliance program, the GAO found (p. 30) that 
"the almost nonexistence of enforcement actions taken could imply to 
contractors that the compliance agencies do not intend to enforce the 
program." That this is not merely politics can be judged from the fact 
that the Department of Labor has been sued with some measure of
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success more than once for failure to enforce affirmative action proper 
ly. [See, e.g., the case of Legal Aid Society ofAlameda County v. Bren- 
nan, 608 R2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied 100 S.Ct. 3010 (1980).] 
Debarment, the ultimate sanction, has been used less than 30 times; 
debarment of the first nonconstruction contractor did not occur until 
1974. The GAO and USCCR have found that other forms of regulatory 
pressure, such as pre-award reviews, delay of contract award, and 
withholding of progress payments, have not been forcefully and con 
sistently pursued. However, as evidenced by the increased incidence of 
debarment and back-pay awards, enforcement did become more ag 
gressive after 1973.
In light of the unanimity of these process studies in finding the affir 
mative action regulatory mechanism seriously deficient, it is surprising 
that the few econometric studies of the impact of affirmative action in 
its first years (Burman 1973; Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Goldstein 
and Smith 1976; Heckman and Wolpin 1976), all based on a comparison 
of EEO-1 forms by contractor status, have generally found significant 
evidence that it has been effective for black males. These few studies 
of the initial years of affirmative action (1966-73) are not directly com 
parable because of different specifications, samples, and periods. They 
do find, nevertheless, that despite weak enforcement in its early years, 
and despite the ineffectiveness of compliance reviews, affirmative ac 
tion has been effective in increasing black male employment share in 
the contractor sector, but generally ineffective for other protected groups. 
(See Brown 1984a for a review.) These past studies are all based on data 
for a period that largely predates the beginning of substantial enforce 
ment of regulations barring sex discrimination, the start of aggressive 
enforcement in the mid-seventies, and the major reorganization of the 
contract compliance agencies into the Office of Federal Contract Com 
pliance Programs (OFCCP) in 1978.
The effects are not large, generally on the order of less than a 1 per 
cent increase in the black male share of employment per year. However, 
they do imply that even with seemingly weak enforcement, affirmative 
action under the contract compliance program did increase the propor 
tion of black males in federal contractor firms in the early 1970s.
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The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment
Has affirmative action been effective in increasing the employment 
of minorities and women? Affirmative action under the executive order 
applies only to federal contractors. One method of judging the effect 
of affirmative action is then to compare the growth of minority and female 
employment at federal contractor establishments with their employment 
growth at similar establishments that do not bear the affirmative action 
obligation. With the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Labor, I per 
formed such a comparison using EEO-1 data on employment 
demographics reported by 68,690 establishments in 1974 and 1980. This 
sample includes more than 16 million employees. The results summarized 
here are reported at length in Leonard (1983) and (1984a).
Table 1 (reproduced from Leonard 1984a) compares the mean employ 
ment share of demographic groups in 1974 and 1980 across contractor 
and noncontractor establishments. Between 1974 and 1980, black male 
and female and white female employment shares increased significant 
ly faster in contractor establishments than in noncontractor "establishments. 
In Leonard (1984a), I have estimated the impact of affirmative action 
after controlling for establishment size, growth, region, industry, oc 
cupational and corporate structure. Even controlling for these other fac 
tors, the employment of members of protected groups grew significant 
ly faster in contractor than in noncontractor establishments.
Expressed as an annual growth rate, black male employment is 0.62 
percent greater in the contractor sector. For white males, the annual 
growth rate is 0.2 percent slower among contractors, so contractor status 
appears to shift the demand for black males relative to white males by 
0.82 percent per year. The annual demand shifts relative to white males 
for other groups are: other minority males 1.48 percent; white females 
0.66 percent; and black females 2.15 percent. These effects are signifi 
cant at the 99 percent confidence level or better, and are robust across 
a number of specifications. The effects for black males are similar in 
magnitude to those previously estimated by Ashenfelter and Heckman 
(1976) and by Heckman and Wolpin (1976).
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NOTE. The last column reports f-statistics for whether the change in demographic share be 
tween 1974 and 1980 differs by contractor status. N=noncontractor in 1974 (27,432 establishments), 
Y=contractor in 1974 (41,258 establishments).
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Compliance reviews are the main enforcement mechanism; they in 
volve an audit of employee demographics and employer's personnel pro 
cedures, with negotiations over suggested changes. Compliance reviews 
have played a significant role over and above that of contractor status. 
For example, for black males the growth rate in their employment was 
3.8 percent greater in the contractor sector than in the noncontractor 
sector, while it was an additional 7.9 percent greater for those who had 
a compliance review compared to those who had not had such a review. 
Conversely, compliance reviews have retarded the employment growth 
of whites. The effect is significantly negative in the case of white females, 
but small and insignificant in the case of white males, whom one would 
have expected to bear the brunt of the adjustment. The anomalous result 
for white females is sensitive to specification. It is also difficult to recon 
cile with the positive impact of contractor status on white females, but 
may be influenced by a review process that asks for more than last year, 
rather than more than average, in a time of sharply increasing female 
labor supply. Direct pressure does make a difference. Simultaneity is 
unlikely to bias these estimates because, as we shall see, the probability 
of being reviewed hardly depends upon demographics.
The total impact of affirmative action on the growth rate of employ 
ment for black men among federal contractors is then the weighted average 
of the annual 0.62 percent shift among nonreviewed contractors and the 
1.91 percent shift among reviewed contractors, or 0.84 percent per year. 
The corresponding demand shifts for other groups are black females 
2.13 percent, minority males 1.69 percent, and white females 0.37 percent.
Regression estimates also indicate that minorities and females ex 
perienced significantly greater increases in representation in 
establishments that were growing and so had many job openings, irrespec 
tive of affirmative action. The elasticity of white male employment growth 
with respect to total employment growth is .976, significantly less than 
one. This indicates that members of protected groups dominate the net 
incoming flows in both contractor and noncontractor establishments. The 
supply of blacks has not greatly increased, so this suggests the impor 
tance in expanding employment opportunities of broader forces, such 
as Title VII, which apply to all sample establishments. The respective 
elasticities for black males, black females, white females, and other males
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(1.22, 1.19, 1.02 and 1.09) are significantly greater than one. The efficacy 
of affirmative action also depends heavily on employment growth. Af 
firmative action has been far more successful at establishments that are 
growing and have more job openings to accommodate federal pressure. 
Although affirmative action has lacked public consensus and vigorous 
enforcement, and has frequently been criticized as an exercise in paper 
pushing, it has actually been of material importance in prompting com 
panies to increase their employment of blacks.
Occupational Advance
One of the major affirmative action battlefields lies in the white-collar 
and craft occupations. In these skilled positions, employers are most 
sensitive to productivity differences and have complained the most about 
the burden of goals for minority and female employment. It is also in 
this region of relatively inelastic supply that the potential wage gains 
to members of protected groups are the greatest.
The four econometric studies mentioned earlier, which found employ 
ment gains for blacks despite little enforcement of affirmative action 
in its early years, also found that while affirmative action increases total 
black male employment among federal contractors, it does not increase 
their employment share in the skilled occupations (Burman 1973; 
Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Goldstein and Smith 1976; Heckman 
and Wolpin 1976). These studies suggest that contractors had been able 
to fulfill their obligations by hiring into relatively unskilled positions. 
Before 1974, affirmative action appears to have been more effective in 
increasing employment than in promoting occupational advancement.
Some might argue that such a result is only to be expected, given a 
short supply of skilled minorities or females. However, even in the case 
of a small fixed supply, affirmative action should induce a reshuffling 
of skilled blacks and women from noncontractor to contractor firms, 
without any increase in overall supply being necessary. The long-run 
presumption behind affirmative action, however, is that trainable members 
of protected groups will be considered for promotion to skilled employ 
ment. Indeed, by the later 1970s, affirmative action was no longer as
The Federal Anti-Bias Effort 95
ineffective as it may have been in its early years at increasing minority 
employment in skilled occupations (Leonard 1984b). This difference may 
reflect the increasing supply of highly educated blacks, as well as the more 
aggressive enforcement program that developed in the mid- to late 1970s.
Analyzing occupational advance within nine broad occupations be 
tween 1974 and 1980, Leonard (1984b) finds black males' share of employ 
ment increased faster in contractor than in noncontractor establishments 
in every occupation except laborers and white-collar trainees, and ex 
cept for operatives and professionals these differences are significant. 
The impact is found in both the proportionate change in black males' 
share of total employment, and in the proportionate change in the ratio 
of black male to white male share.
The total impact of the contract compliance program, the weighted 
sum of contractor and review effects, shows some evidence of a twist 
in demand toward more highly skilled black males. The contract com 
pliance program has not reduced the demand for black males in low- 
skilled occupations except for laborers. It has raised the demand for black 
males more in the highly skilled white-collar and craft jobs than in the 
blue-collar operative, laborer, and service occupations. While this may 
help explain why highly skilled black males have been better off than 
their less skilled brethren, it does not help explain why black males should 
be having greater difficulty over the years in finding and holding jobs. 
Neither employment-population ratios nor unemployment rates of blacks 
relative to whites have shown a marked improvement over the past two 
decades.
Establishments that are not part of multiplant corporations have 
significantly lower growth rates of employment for members of protected 
groups. Corporate size is probably of greater consequence than establish 
ment size, with larger corporations showing greater increases in minority 
and female employment. Establishment size itself has insignificant ef 
fects on white and black males, but other males and black females grow 
significantly faster at larger establishments, while white females grow 
significantly slower. It is also important to note that the tests here also 
control for the skill requirements of each establishment. Establishments 
that are nonclerical white-collar-intensive exhibit faster employment 
growth for both male and female blacks and significantly slower growth 
for white males.
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For a program lacking public consensus and vigorous enforcement, 
this is a surprisingly strong showing. While the gains of white females 
are smaller than those of blacks, it is important to keep in mind that 
the employment of females and minorities has been increasing in both 
sectors. Indeed, if the OFCCP pressured establishments to hire more 
females and minorities relative to their own past records rather than to 
industry and region averages, the observed pattern is just what we would 
expect to see during a period when female labor supply had been grow 
ing. Females' share would increase at all establishments because of the 
supply shift, and contractor establishments would be under little pressure 
to employ more females than noncontractors. The relatively short history 
of affirmative action for females may also help explain the differential 
impact of affirmative action across protected groups.
Affirmative action has also helped nonblack minority males, although 
to a lesser extent. There is evidence of a twist in demand toward Hispanic, 
Asian, and American Indian males in white-collar occupations, par 
ticularly in sales and clerical positions, and away from this group in 
operative and laborer positions. Compliance reviews have had a strong 
and significant additional impact in the professional, managerial, and 
craft occupations. The total impact of the contract compliance program 
on nonblack minority males is positive in the white-collar, craft, and 
service occupations, and in training programs. Relative to white males, 
affirmative action has increased the occupational status of nonblack 
minority males by 2 percent.
The evidence within occupations suggests that the contract compliance 
program has had a mixed, and often negative impact on white females. 
For technical, sales, clerical, craft, and trainee workers, contractor status 
is associated with a significant decline in white females' employment 
share. Compliance reviews have also often had a negative impact. While 
both contracts and reviews produce a significant 1 percent increase in 
the index of white females' occupational status, this positive impact disap 
pears when change in white females' occupational status are compared 
to the relatively greater gains of white males.
Black females in contractor establishments have increased their employ 
ment share in all occupations except technical, craft, and white-collar
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trainee. The positive impact of the contract program is even more marked 
when the position of black females is compared with that of white females.
It is possible that part of this occupational upgrading may be overstated 
because of biased reporting to the government, in particular the upward 
reclassification of minority or female-intensive occupations, as argued 
in the useful paper by Smith and Welch (1984). To the extent that con 
tractors may have selectively reclassifled black- and female-intensive 
occupations at a faster rate than did noncontractors, most studies will 
overstate the actual occupational advance due to affirmative action. 
However, this effect is unlikely to overwhelm the general direction of 
the results; pure reclassification would cause black losses in the lower 
occupations, which is generally not observed.
Moreover, this finding of occupational advance for nonwhite males 
is reinforced by evidence from Current Population Survey wage equa 
tions that affirmative action has narrowed the difference in earnings be 
tween the races by raising the occupational level of nonwhite males. These 
wage equations are reported at greater length in Leonard (1984d). These 
estimates of the wage effects of affirmative action offer evidence sug 
gesting that the underlying supply of labor is not perfectly elastic. Minori 
ty male wages are higher relative to those of white males in cities and 
industries with a high proportion of employment in federal contractor 
establishments subject to affirmative action, although the effect is not 
always significant.
Affirmative action does not appear to have contributed to the economic 
bifurcation of the black community. Given increased pressure to justify 
the nonpromotion or discharge of blacks, fears have been raised that 
employers will screen blacks more intensely and be less willing to risk 
employing less skilled blacks. In practice, affirmative action appears 
to increase the demand for poorly educated minority males as well as 
for the highly educated. The lesson to be drawn from this evidence is 
that affirmative action programs work best when they are vigorouly en 
forced, when they work with other policies that augment the skills of 
members of protected groups, and when they work with growing 
employers.
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Goals or Quotas?
Have these employment advances been achieved through the use of 
rigid quotas? The goals and timetables for the employment of minorities 
and females drawn from federal contractors under affirmative action stand 
accused of two mutually inconsistent charges. The first is that "goal" 
is really just an expedient and polite word for quota. Affirmative action 
has really imposed inflexible quotas for minority and female employ 
ment. The second is that these goals are worth less than the paper they 
are written on. Affirmative action is a game played for paper stakes and 
has never been enforced stringently enough to produce significant results.
Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors are required to take 
affirmative action not to discriminate and to develop affirmative action 
plans (AAPs), including goals and timetables, for good-faith efforts to 
correct deficiencies in minority and female employment. The aim of 
this section, which summarizes Leonard (1985b), is to measure good 
faith, to determine what affirmative action promises are worth. Is negotia 
tion over affirmative action goals an empty charade played with proper 
ly penciled forms, or does it in fact lead to more jobs for minorities 
and females in the contractor sector? If the latter is the case, are these 
goals so strictly adhered to as to constitute quotas? Since the reviews 
examined here have already been shown to be useful (Leonard 1984a), 
the question here is not "Are reviews effective?" but rather "Do pro 
mises extracted during the review process contribute to the impact of 
reviews?"
It is not beyond reason to suppose that they do not. Neither the penalties 
for inflating promises to hasten the departure of federal inspectors nor 
the prospects of being apprehended seems great. The ultimate sanction 
available to the government in the case of affirmative action is debar- 
ment, in which a firm is barred from holding federal contracts. The first 
debarment of a nonconstruction contractor did not take place until 1974, 
and in total only 26 firms have ever been debarred. If the OFCCP finds 
the establishment's affirmative action plan unacceptable, it may issue 
a show-cause notice as a preliminary step to high sanctions. This step 
has been taken in only 1 to 4 percent of all reviews (USCCR 1975,
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p. 297). Of these, one-third to one-half involve basic and blatant paper 
work deficiencies such as the failure to prepare or update an AAP (U.S. 
GAO 1975, p. 26).
The other major sanction used by the OFCCP is back-pay awarded 
as part of a conciliation agreement. In 1973 and 1974, $54 million was 
awarded in 91 settlements, averaging $63 per beneficiary (U.S. GAO 1975, 
p. 46). In 1980, in an even more skewed distribution, $9.2 million was 
awarded to 4,336 employees in 743 conciliation agreements (USCCR 
1982, p. 47). These beneficiaries represented less than two-thirds of 1 
percent of all protected-group employees at just the reviewed 
establishments. While these affirmative action sanctions have not been 
heavily employed, in many cases regulatory sanctions, like weapons of 
war, are judged most successful just when they are used the least. That 
does not seem to be the case here. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
the General Accounting Office, committees of both houses of Congress, 
and the courts have all concurred in the judgment that the contract com 
pliance agencies have not made full and effective use of the sanctions 
at their disposal.
The low penalties are compounded by the low probability of apprehen 
sion, although the Department of Defense (DOD), upon whose review 
this section concentrates, had one of the most vigorous programs. In 
1976 DOD is reported to have reviewed 24 percent of its identified con 
tractors, compared to an average for all compliance agencies of 11 per 
cent (USCCR 1977, p. 113). In 1977 DOD had a ratio of 42 contractor 
facilities per staff member, and a total budget of $345 per contractor 
(USCCR 1977, p. 107). It is striking to note that compliance reviews 
have not typically been targeted directly against the most blatant form 
of employment discrimination. An establishment's history of employ 
ment demographics has typically not played a role in the incidence of 
compliance reviews, for a reason as procedurally obvious as it is logically 
obscure: compliance officers have not generally looked at an establish 
ment's past Affirmative Action Plans (AAPs) or EEO-1 forms in targeting 
reviews. Heckman and Wolpin (1976) report that reviews are esential- 
ly random with respect to the level or growth rates of an establishment's 
demographics. Leonard (1985b) finds evidence that establishments with
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more blacks and females are actually more likely to be subsequently 
reviewed. These two empirical studies agree that affirmative action com 
pliance reviews have not been targeted with greater frequency at 
establishments with relatively few minorities or females.
In this light, the expected penalties for making promises to the govern 
ment with little regard for the likelihood of fulfilling those promises 
do not seem overwhelming. In such circumstances, affirmative action 
promises may contain little, if any, information about the establishment's 
future employment. On the other hand, the OFCCP may use more subtle 
and less easily observed pressures. Firms may care about their reputa 
tions, not only with the OFCCP, but also with their own employees and 
the public, and so strive to set reasonable goals. More important, firms 
may react to the threat of Title VII litigation, with its substantial legal 
costs and penalties, hanging over their heads while under affirmative 
action review.
The employment goals that firms agree to under affirmative action 
are not vacuous; neither are they adhered to as strictly as quotas. While 
affirmative action promises are inflated, they are not hollow. For a sample 
of establishments that experienced more than one compliance review 
during the 1970s, Leonard (1985b) compares the goals with the employ 
ment actually achieved one year later. The model year for which pro 
jections are made is 1976. Establishments on average overestimate the 
growth of total employment. They project 1 percent employment growth 
one year ahead, but on average, employment subsequently falls by 3 
percent.
Neither absolute minority nor female employment increased, but both 
minority and female employment shares did increase. This is because 
the contraction in employment that occurred was almost lily-white and 
predominantly male. Most of the average employment decline of 27 was 
accounted for by white males, whose employment fell by 21. Put another 
way, while white males averaged 63 percent of initial employment, they 
accounted for 78 percent of the employment decline. Since females and 
minorities typically have lower seniority, they are usually found to suf 
fer disproportionately more during a downturn. In this perspective, the 
finding here that white males accounted for most of the employment
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decline is itself striking evidence of the impact of affirmative action. 
These establishments are projecting swift and substantial increases in 
black male employment.
These projections and actualizations can also be expressed as shares 
of total employment. Over time, minority and female employment shares 
are indeed growing, but not nearly as fast as projected. The firms pro 
ject growth in minority and female employment share far in excess of 
their own past history, and far in excess of what they will actually fulfill. 
Is there then any information at all in their projections, or is the entire 
procedure an exercise in futility?
The administrative records of completed compliance reviews include 
data on past and projected employment demographics, indications of 
deficiencies found in affirmative action plans, and an indicator for pre- 
award compliance reviews in which case one might expect the govern 
ment's leverage to be greater. These records also indicate successively 
higher levels of government pressures brought to bear: hours expended 
by review officers, progress reports required, conciliation process in 
itiated, and, finally, show-cause notice issued. Each of these mileposts 
in the bargaining process reflects both the establishment's resistance to 
bureaucratic pressures and, at the same time, increasing levels of 
bureaucratic pressure itself. If establishment resistance can be control 
led for, then these may be taken roughly as inputs into a regulatory pro 
duction function. By assuming that corporate resistance is controlled 
for by past growth rates of protected-group employment share, and by 
initial notification of deficiencies, we can then ask what the marginal 
impact is on factors of regulatory production such as conciliation 
agreements and show-cause notices. These identifying assumptions are 
open to question. Caution should be exercised in interpreting the following 
results since they may be biased toward finding ineffective enforcement 
if enforcement has been targeted against the most recalcitrant cases.
In general, the results on the impact of various enforcement tools are 
mixed and often insignificant. On average, employers had not significantly 
altered their demographics a year later in response to pre-award reviews, 
interim progress reports, conciliation agreements, or show-cause notices. 
On the whole, there is no compelling evidence that these detailed com 
ponents of the enforcement process have a significant impact on the 
employment of members of protected groups.
102 The Federal Anti-Bias Effort
The major finding in Leonard (1985b) is that goals set in these costly 
negotiations do have a measurable and significant correlation with im 
provements in the employment of minorities and females at reviewed 
establishments. At the same time, these goals are not being fulfilled with 
the rigidity one would expect of quotas. While the projections of future 
employment of members of protected groups are inflated, the 
establishments that promise to employ more do actually employ more. 
The striking finding is that the affirmative action goal is the single best 
predictor of subsequent employment demographics. It is far better than 
the establishment's own past history, even controlling for the direct im 
pact of detailed regulatory pressure.
This indicates that while establishments promise more than they deliver, 
the ones that promise more do deliver more, even conditioning on the 
past growth rate of employment share. There is significant information 
in the projection over and above what could have been predicted on the 
basis of past history. On the other hand, the projection falls far short 
of perfect information. For example, on average a projected 11 percent 
age point increase in the growth rate of black male employment share 
results in an actual increase of 1 percentage point, ceteris paribus.
Not only do establishments generally overpromise minority and female 
employment, they also overpromise white male employment. This reveals 
something of their strategy in formulating promises. They do not promise 
direct substitution of minority and female workers for white males; in 
stead they promise more for all. More accurately, they promise to make 
room for more minority and female employees by increasing the size 
of the total employment pie. The first step in bringing these projections 
down to earth may simply be to ask the establishment whether the pro 
jected growth in total employment is reasonable.
We have a policy that appears to be effective in its whole and ineffec 
tive in its parts. Protected-group employment share does generally grow 
more rapidly at reviewed firms, and goals are strongly correlated with 
this growth. Do our results then indicate only the establishments' pro 
jections reflect variations in supply known to them rather than induced 
variations in demand? Alternatively, can we infer that extracting greater 
promises will result in greater achievement? The critical evidence is that
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there is an overall response to pressure. Within labor markets of the same 
industry and region, reviewed contractors do better than the nonreviewed, 
as other work shows. As discussed here, within a given SMSA the 
establishments that set higher goals achieve greater growth rates of 
protected-group employment. My reading of this evidence is that while 
much of the nitpicking over paperwork is ineffective, the system of af 
firmative action goals has played a significant role in improving employ 
ment opportunities for members of protected groups.
The Targeting of Compliance Reviews
Affirmative action can be broadly conceived of as pursuing either anti 
discrimination or job and earnings redistribution goals. That is to say, 
it can either pursue equality of opportunity or equality of result. Given 
the historical record, progress toward one goal will often entail progress 
toward the other. In particular, discrimination seems to be a broad enough 
target that it can be hit even with imperfect aim. The central question 
that this section, drawn from Leonard (1985a), seeks to answer is: what 
are the actual goals of affirmative action? The approach taken here is 
to infer the ends of affirmative action policy from an analysis of the 
historical record of actual enforcement.
Assertions concerning the ends of affirmative action are surprisingly 
common, especially when one realizes that only once in the past has 
the actual pattern of enforcement been analyzed. This pathbreaking study 
of Heckman and Wolpin (1976) examined the incidence of compliance 
reviews at a sample of 1,185 Chicago area establishments during 1972. 
These compliance reviews are the first, the most common, and usually 
the last step in the enforcement process. Heckman and Wolpin find that 
the probability of review is not affected by establishment size, minority 
employment, or change in minority employment. They discover "no 
evidence of a systematic government policy for reviewing contractor 
firms." In other words, they find an essentially random enforcement pro 
cess. This first analysis of targeting studied a relatively small sample
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in one city during the early 1970s, before the contract compliance pro 
gram reached full stride. Do these early findings hold true for the na 
tion as a whole after affirmative action regulations and procedures 
matured? Just as important, how are such results to be interpreted?
Which establishments does the OFCCP actually choose to review? 
Can we judge its motives from its targeting policy, and do the goals so 
revealed conform to those mandated in the executive order? The OFCCP 
has had, on paper, formal targeting systems such as the Revised McKersie 
System or the later EISEN system. These systems generally target in 
a sensible fashion against discrimination by selecting for review those 
establishments with a low proportion of minorities or females relative 
to other establishments in the same area and industry. But interviews 
with OFCCP officials in Washington and in the field suggest that these 
formal targeting systems were never really used. Instead of targeting on 
the basis of an establishment's past demographic record, compliance 
officers claim they simply reviewed the firms with the most employees, 
and the growing firms. This section shows which types of establishments 
were actually reviewed between 1974 and 1980, primarily by the Depart 
ment of Defense. As such, the patterns shown here may not be indicative 
of current policies or practices of the OFCCP, nor of past practices of 
their compliance agencies. In addition, part of the patterns observed here 
may reflect the requirements for pre-award compliance reviews.
The model of affirmative action as an earnings redistribution program 
has two testable implications. One can at best offer weak support for 
the hypothesis, while the second can provide somewhat stronger sup 
port. The first is that no particular pressure should be applied to firms 
with relatively few minorities or females, as observed in Leonard (1985a). 
While this strongly rejects the model of affirmative action as anti 
discrimination in employment, if offers weak support for the alternative 
hypothesis of affirmative action as earnings redistribution because it is 
also compatible with other models of regulatory behavior. The second 
implication of the earnings redistribution model is that greater pressure 
should be brought to bear to shift demand curves where the supply of 
labor is relatively inelastic. In particular, this implies a higher incidence 
of compliance reviews at establishments with nonclerical, white-collar-
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intensive workforces. I find significant evidence that this is what the 
OFCCP has done.
If one thought of the OFCCP's primary concern as fighting the most 
blatant forms of prima fade employment discrimination directly in the 
workplace, one might then expect reviews to be concentrated at 
establishments with a relatively small proportion of females and black 
males, controlling for size, industry, and region. There is little consis 
tent significant evidence of this in the past. In part, this may be explain 
ed by the requirement of pre-award compliance reviews. Establishments 
with the smallest proportion of minorities or females, ceteris paribus, 
are not consistently more likely to be reviewed for compliance with Ex 
ecutive Order 11246. Reviews are significantly more likely to take place, 
ceteris paribus, in nonclerical, white-collar-intensive establishments. 
Reviews are also more likely to occur at both large and growing 
establishments, where any costs to white males are likely to be more 
diffused.
How can the lack of a consistent targeting pattern by race or sex be 
explained? The larger establishments often employ a greater proportion 
of minorities and females. In interviews, field officers of the OFCCP 
have stated that they do not generally look at an establishment's past 
demographic record in targeting reviews. Reviewing large nonclerical, 
white-collar-intensive establishments with little regard for their past record 
of minority or female employment is consistent with an affirmative ac 
tion effort that in terms of compliance review targeting is primarily con 
cerned not with attacking the grossest prima facie forms of current 
employment discrimination, but rather with redistributing jobs and earn 
ings to minorities and women.
The 1980s
Black economic advance faltered along a number of dimensions dur 
ing the 1980s. I do not know how much of this was due to weakened 
affirmative action, but I do know that affirmative action under the con 
tract compliance program virtually ceased to exist in all but name after 
1980 (Leonard 1987). From a public relations perspective, the gutting
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of the program had a certain artfulness. With no greater staffing or budget, 
the OFCCP doubled the number of compliance reviews. A wondrously 
invigorated bureaucracy doubling its efficiency? It is easy to go twice 
as fast when they are just going through the motions, with more desk 
reviews and fewer in-depth audits. After 1980, fewer administrative com 
plaints were filed, back-pay awards were phased out, and the already 
rare penalty of debarment became an endangered species. Over the same 
period, staffing and real budget were reduced. This type of surface en 
forcement resulted not just in stagnation, but in a reversal of black ad 
vances under affirmative action. Between 1980 and 1984, both male and 
female black employment grew much more slowly among contractors 
than noncontractors (Leonard 1987). Affirmative action, such as it was, 
no longer aided blacks. Consider the different response before and after 
1980 of black male employment growth to total establishment employ 
ment growth of 10 percent. Before 1980 this would result in 12 percent 
black male employment growth among noncontractors, and 17 percent 
among contractors. After 1980, the comparable rates are 11 percent among 
noncontractors and 10 percent among contractors. The reversal for black 
females is even more marked.
It was as though contractors were returning to a growth path they had 
been forced off by previous affirmative action efforts. This is discouraging 
news. Affirmative action seeks to give those discriminated against a 
chance to demonstrate their skills, and thus to break the preconceptions 
upon which prejudicial barriers are based. Under this model, affirmative 
action should serve as long-term innoculation against discrimination, 
and previous victims of discrimination should continue to progress even 
after active treatment has ceased.
The evidence supports far less optimistic views of what is at stake. 
The decline of black employment advances under the affirmative inac 
tion program of the 1980s suggests either that affirmative action during 
the 1970s resulted in discrimination against whites, or that ongoing treat 
ment is required to counteract the after-effects of generations of 
discrimination, or that there is a persistence and resiliency to the taste 
for discrimination against blacks.
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The Impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
While the central focus of this analysis has been on affirmative ac 
tion under the Executive Order, it should be understood that the Ex 
ecutive Order has functioned within the backdrop of Title VII's Con 
gressional mandate and substantial legal sanctions. The dominant policy 
has been established under Title VII. What impact then has Title VII 
had? Without attempting to review this question as thoroughly as I have 
affirmation action, I can sketch some results. For a more complete discus 
sion, see Brown (1984a), Freeman (1981), Butler and Heckman (1977), 
and Smith (1978).
The broadest perspective may be gained by considering what changes 
have occurred in the earnings, income, occupational positions, and 
employment of blacks relative to whites before and after passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In reviewing this evidence, Richard B. Freeman 
(1978, p. 3) finds that "virtually every indicator of positions shows a 
marked improvement in the economic status of employed black workers 
with as has been widely noted by various analysts gains concentrated 
among women, highly educated or skilled men, and young men. Vir 
tually every indicator of positions also shows a marked acceleration in 
the economic status of employed black workers after 1964, when the 
U.S. anti-bias effort intensified as a result of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of that year" (emphasis added). While a substantial part of this 
improvement can be attributed to the improved education of blacks (see 
Smith 1978), Title VII appears to have also contributed substantially and 
directly to improving the economic position of employed blacks at a given 
level of education.
While employed blacks appear to have approached parity with whites 
more rapidly since 1964, proportionately fewer blacks pass the initial 
hurdle of becoming employed. As Freeman (1978, p. 10) notes, "At the 
same time that there has been a marked movement toward equality of 
earnings between employed blacks and whites, however, there has been 
a distressing deterioration in the likelihood of blacks holding jobs, par 
ticularly among the young. In 1964 the black male civilian employ 
ment/population ratio stood at .73, in 1969 it was .73, and in 1979 it was 
.64. By contrast, for white males, the ratio went from .78 (1964) to .78
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(1969) to .75 (1979). Equally striking, the youth joblessness problem of 
the decade was one of increasing relative worsening in the black youth 
positions, for reasons that no one has yet satisfactorily explained. The 
aggregate data thus tell two stories: improvement for the employed but 
a reduction in the overall employment rate, especially in the 1970s."
More recently, attempts have been made by Beller (1979) and Leonard 
(1984c) to measure the impact of Title VII more directly using cross- 
sectional data. Beller finds some evidence that EEOC efforts have reduced 
the gender wage gap.
Before 1972, the Justice Department was empowered to bring suit 
through the courts for enforcement of Title VII's provisions. The EEOC's 
powers were limited to conciliation and persuasion. Since 1972 the power 
of litigation has been entrusted to the EEOC which, in turn, can pass 
it on to individual plaintiffs. By such recourse to the courts, the EEOC 
can sometimes accomplish in years what takes the OFCCP weeks. What 
it gives up in speed, though, it sometimes wins back in power through 
the setting of sweeping legal precedents. For example, the celebrated 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power did not simply aid Griggs or affect only 
Duke Power. By establishing the principle of disparate impact as prima 
facie evidence of discrimination, it placed a heavier burden on all 
employers to avoid the appearance of discrimination.
Between 1964 and 1981, more than 5,000 cases of litigation under Ti 
tle VII, many of which were private suits, were decided in the federal 
district courts. More than 1,700 of these were class-action suits. These 
are the tip of an iceberg consisting of cases settling out of court or decided 
in state courts, but these class-action decisions are likely to generate 
the most publicity, result in the largest awards, and affect the most peo 
ple. What has been the impact of this Title VII litigation?
The enforcement of Title VII through the courts has contributed to 
a significant improvement of the employment and occupational status 
of blacks. In regressions of the impact of the percentage of workers in 
an occupation who are members of a protected group on number of Title 
VII class action suits per corporation, percentage of employment in an 
industry by state cell that is in federal contractor establishments under 
the affirmative action obligation, and a lagged dependent variable, Title 
VII leads to sometimes negative but generally insignificant changes for
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white females, but to a moderate and significant improvement in the 
employment of blacks. The demand shifts for females may simply be 
swamped by the ongoing massive increase in labor supply. In addition, 
many of the early Title VII cases focused on racial rather than gender 
discrimination. The apparent ineffectiveness of antidiscrimination policy 
in promoting female employment remains an interesting question for 
research. Title VII litigation plays a significant role in increasing blacks' 
employment share.
In sum, these results suggest that Title VII litigation has played a signifi 
cant role over and above that of affirmative action. This impact has been 
greater for blacks than for women, and greater for the skilled than for 
the unskilled.
Antidiscrimination or Reverse Discrimination?
We have seen that despite poor targeting, affirmative action has helped 
promote the employment of minorities and women, and that Title VII 
has likely played an even greater role. This raises the most important 
and the most controversial question: has this reduced discrimination,or 
has it gone beyond and induced reverse discrimination against white 
males? This is also the question on which our evidence is least con 
clusive. The finding of decreased employment growth for white males 
is not sufficient to answer the question, since it is consistent with both 
possibilities.
The integration of the American workforce, by race and gender, has 
been among the most far-reaching and controversial goals of domestic 
policy in the past two decades. Some have argued that integration can 
be achieved only at great cost in terms of reduced productivity and pro 
fits, that forced equity will entail reduced productivity. Opponents of 
affirmative action have argued that employers were discriminating on 
the basis of merit, not on the basis of race or gender. If their contention 
is correct, then government policies that favor the hiring and promotion 
of minorities and women should cause a decline in their relative pro 
ductivity. Equal pay restrictions will compound the inefficiency. The 
hypothesis inherent in this argument is that the relative marginal pro 
ductivities of minorities and females have declined as their employment 
has increased and have not moved toward equality with relative wages.
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Using estimates of production functions relating output to inputs for 
the manufacturing sector, Leonard (1984c) finds that relative minority 
and female productivity increased between 1966 and 1977, a period coin 
ciding with government antidiscrimination policy to increase employ 
ment opportunities for members of these groups. There is no signifi 
cant evidence here to support the contention that this increase in employ 
ment equity has had marked efficiency costs. The relative marginal pro 
ductivities of minorities and women have increased as they have pro 
gressed into the workforce, suggesting that discriminatory employment 
practices have been reduced.
If we had observed that relative minority or female productivity fell 
while relative minority or female wages increased, one might suspect 
that government pressure under Title VII and Executive Order 11246 
(affirmative action) had led to reverse discrimination. I find no signifi 
cant evidence of reverse discrimination, nor of any significant decline 
in the relative productivity of minorities or females. Direct tests of the 
impact of governmental antidiscrimination and affirmative action regula 
tion on productivity find no significant evidence of a productivity decline. 
These results suggest that antidiscrimination and affirmative action ef 
forts have helped to reduce discrimination without yet inducing signifi 
cant and substantial reverse discrimination. However, the available 
evidence is not yet strong enough to be compelling on either side of 
this issue. Since the productivity estimates are not measured with great 
precision, strong policy conclusions based on this particular result should 
be resisted.
Conclusion
The policy of affirmative action has had a short and turbulent history 
in this country. Of all the social programs that grew during the sixties, 
it has perhaps enjoyed the least consensus. Its bureaucratic organiza 
tion and body of regulations have undergone change at frequent inter 
vals since its inception. While the targeting of enforcement could be 
improved, and while the impact of affirmative action on other groups 
is still subject to question, the evidence in this study is that affirmative 
action and Title VII can be successful in promoting the integration of 
blacks into the American workplace.
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